This paper contributes with an in-depth investigation of spatial wheat producer market integration between two neighbouring countries, net exporting Hungary and net importing Slovenia.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important targets of the European Union's (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is to facilitate the spatial integration of agricultural markets within the individual member states as well as within the EU. On a spatially integrated market, the price of a product and price information should freely be transmitted between member states to attain an integrated and efficient market.
Although global wheat market is increasingly concentrated in last decades, the role of regional wheat trade also plays an important role. The intra EU wheat trade is dynamically expanding, amounting to 80% (2011 data) of the total EU wheat trade (Eurostat, 2012) . Consequently, the validity of the Law of One Price (LOP) within the EU is an important research and agribusiness policy issue revealing the efficiency of the EU's spatial market integration.
This study provides a quantitative analysis of the wheat producer pricing behaviour on two neighbouring wheat markets in the EU. Namely, the paper aims to investigate spatial wheat producer market integration between Hungary and Slovenia, which are two small open neighbouring Central European economies. These two countries are not competing wheat exporters. Hungary is a major wheat exporting country in the group of the ten New Member States in the 2004 EU enlargement, whilst Slovenia is traditionally net wheat importer. Wheat producer price difference between the two neighbouring countries is expected to lead to price arbitrage from the global wheat market to close the gap between the two prices. Therefore, we expect the co-movement of prices under regional and global wheat market price arbitrage, which prevents price discrimination on long-run.
The wheat trading relations between Hungary and Slovenia have been important before and after the 2004 EU accession. Wheat producer price levels are important for the agricultural markets on both the revenue (wheat sales) and the cost (animal fodder) side of many farms' balance sheets. On the demand side, wheat is important for industrial and bioenergy uses, for concentrates, as well as for human nutrition. Hence, the development of the wheat producer price transmission between Hungary and Slovenia is an important topic for spatial market integration analysis.
For a small open economy, such as Hungary or Slovenia, market efficiency, and market information flow have at least two important business and economic policy consequences. The first one is the transmission of prices by some actors of the food supply chain either vertically or spatially. This issue of international market competitiveness is quite relevant for Hungary and Slovenia, considering the structure of their agro-food markets, which has developed from regionally monopolized markets during the past communist regimes. The second consequence relates to the agricultural support system completing the CAP in the NMS-10, including Hungary and Slovenia. This paper focuses on the first consequence and topic for global business studies, by testing for price transmission between Slovenian and Hungarian wheat producer prices.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting a background on literature review on agri-food business studies focusing on spatial price transmission in wheat markets. Then, we discuss spatial product market integration, followed by an introduction to the methodology. The core of this paper is the fifth part, the empirical analysis focusing on various aspects of market integration. Following the discussion of results, the final section derives main conclusions.
BACKGROUND ON SPATIAL PRICE TRANSMISSION ON WHEAT MARKET
The previous literature on spatial price transmission in wheat markets has mainly focused on US-Canada relationships, main global exporters and international markets (e.g. Pick, & Park, 1991; Pick, & Carter, 1994; Mainardi, 2001; Mohanty & Langley, 2003; Carew, & Florkowski, 2003; Bessler, Yang, & Wongcharupan, 2003; Ghoshray, 2002 Ghoshray, , 2007 Tun-Hsiang, Bessler, & Fuller, 2007; Jin, & Miljkovic, 2008) . Bukenya and Labys (2005) argue that in a spite of im-4 provements in communications and globalization, the empirical results do not support the convergence of wheat commodity prices on world commodity markets in spatially dispersed markets during the period 1930-1998, but a pattern of fluctuating divergences.
However, there are just a few studies on the European wheat markets (e.g. Ejrnaes & Persson, 2000; Thompson, Sul, & Bohl, 2002; Dawson, Sanjuan, & White, 2006; Brosig et al., 2011; Eryigit and Karaman, 2011) . Pall et al. (2013) provide a quantitative analysis of the pricing behaviour of Russian wheat exporters. And only a few studies concentrate on relationships between EU-15 and a Central and Eastern European (CEE) country (e.g. Bakucs et al., 2012) .
To the best of our knowledge, there is no published research focusing on spatial product market integration of cereal prices between two CEE countries, and particularly not between Hungary and Slovenia. Most of wheat trade between these two countries is soft wheat as a rather homogenous product in bilateral trade and in domestic wheat production. In a spite of possible deficits in the development of market institutions and market inefficiencies, the LOP and symmetric price transmission might hold as global price arbitrage can prevent possible price discrimination. Therefore, the evolution of spatial price transmission and functioning of regional wheat markets is perhaps of even more interest in transition and emerging market economies than in developed ones. This paper adds to the existing literature of spatial product market integration by the detailed analyses of horizontal price transmission between Hungarian and Slovenian wheat markets at the producer level, using monthly wheat producer price data from January 2000 to April 2011.
We employ a battery of econometric techniques, starting with a linear Vector Error Correction model (VEC), followed by two non-linear cointegration frameworks, each shedding light into different aspects of product market integration.
SPATIAL PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION
Research on the spatial integration of agricultural markets is often used to test the efficiency of agricultural markets. Perfectly integrated markets are usually assumed to be efficient. Tomek and Robinson (2003) define the two axioms of the international price differences theory:
1. The price difference in any two international markets involved in trade with each other equals the transfer costs.
2. The price difference between any two international markets not involved in trade with each other is smaller than the transfer costs.
Transfer costs are equal to transportation costs between markets and various other handling costs.
Let's consider, two spatially different markets, where the price of a given good on market 1 in time t is P1t and on market 2 in time t is P2t respectively. The two markets are considered integrated, if the price on market 1 equals the price on market 2 corrected with transportation and other handling costs, Kt:
Trade between the two markets occurs only if |P1t -P2t|> Kt. To put it other way, the arbitrage ensures that prices of the same good traded in spatially separate international markets equalize.
Empirical literature usually tests the validity of the `LOP by considering the following equation, with prices expressed in logarithms 1 :
According of the strong version of LOP, prices of a given good on the spatially separated international markets are equal, and they move perfectly together in time. Using the coefficients of equation (2), the necessary conditions are β0 = 0, and β1 = 1. In real life, however, the strong version of LOP occurs only very rarely, therefore the weak version of LOP was also defined.
The weak version of LOP states that only the price ratio is constant, the actual price level is (FAO, 2012) , it is unlikely that their traders may be able to exercise market power. Therefore, it is also unlikely that they may be able to impose an asymmetric adjustment to the long-run bilateral price equilibrium as response to negative or positive short-run price deviations (shocks). Therefore, we test the following H3 on competitive international wheat market conditions:
H3:
Given the competitive international wheat market conditions, adjustment between Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices is symmetric, i.e. negative and positive price deviations from long-run equilibrium are transmitted with equal speed.
And finally, as a number of empirical studies has shown (e.g. Götz & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2008; Stephens et al., 2008 ) the LOP might hold or not 2 , depending on trade volumes, or more specifically of the market share of products from country A to country B. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:
The magnitude of price elasticity (β1 in equation (2)) depends on the share of wheat imported from Hungary in total Slovenian wheat imports. 8
METHODOLOGY
Our three stage empirical strategy follows the set hypotheses outlined in the previous section, and is nested within the non-stationary time series framework. After determining the order of integration of the series, we employ system and single equation cointegration tests, followed by the estimation of VEC models (where appropriate) 3 . We start with the most commonly used linear cointegration tests, to check whether long-run co-movement of prices exists and whether strong or weak versions of LOP holds. Second, we assess whether there are or not asymmetries with respect to the speed of adjustment using the Enders and Siklos (2001) 
where Yt is a vector of non-stationary variables (in our case the Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices), p is the lag number, Et =(E1t E2t…Eqt)' is a matrix of q dummy variables, where Ej,t = 1 if observation t belongs to the j th period and 0 otherwise, Dj,t-i is an impulse dummy that equals 1 if observation t is the i th observation of the j th period, meant to render the corresponding residuals to zero. Гi and Кj,i are short run matrices, α is the speeds of adjustment parameter matrix, β are the long run cointegration coefficients and μ are the long run drift parame-9 ters. The ut residuals are supposed to be independently and identically distributed with zero mean and symmetric and positive definite variance-covariance matrix Ω. Restrictions on the model on LOP and weak exogeneity of the Hungarian wheat producer prices (H1 and H2) can be tested using likelihood ratio tests. Equation (3) may be re-written as:
where εt is the stationary error correction term, in fact the residuals of the long-run cointegration equation. Equations (3) and (4) assume that the adjustment process is symmetric, i.e. positive and negative price deviations induce the same adjustment (H3). Enders and Siklos (2001) propose a more flexible threshold cointegration test, allowing different adjustment speeds with respect to positive and negative price changes. The respected test equation has the following form:
where εt-1 are the lagged error correction terms, Δεt-i lags of the dependent variable, to account for residual serial autocorrelation, and vt independently and identically distributed residuals, and finally, It the Heaviside function with the following properties:
where τ is the threshold value. The test regression is appropriate (convergent) if ρ1 and ρ2 coefficients are negative. Cointegration is tested by the so called Tmax and Φ statistics, both with nonstandard distribution. More importantly, the null hypothesis of symmetrical adjustment (ρ1 = ρ2) against the alternative of asymmetric adjustment is tested using an F-test. Should adjustment asymmetries be incorporated into a VEC model, equation (4) displays the following form:
Whilst the Enders and Siklos (2001) method, allows for non-linear short-run adjustment process, the long-run cointegrating relationship is unique and linear. Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006) propose the following cointegrating regression with threshold non-linearity, where not only the short-run process, but also cointegrating equilibrium relationship can vary according to the dynamics imposed by a stationary exogenous variable. Let yt and xt be the Slovenian and Hungarian wheat prices, and qt-d with d≥1 a stationary exogenous variable defining the regimes:
After estimation, the following sup LM statistic (equation (11)) is used to test the null hypothesis of linear cointegration (10) against the alternative of cointegration with threshold adjustments (8):
and X stacks xt corresponding to the linear, and Xγ stacks xtI(qt-d>γ) for the non-linear model, ut and vt are scalar and stationary disturbance terms, I(qt-d>γ) is the indicator function taking the value of 1 when qt-d>γ and 0 otherwise. Depending on the test result, a linear or regime dependent VEC model may be estimated.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Data
Monthly wheat producer prices for Hungary and Slovenia from January 2000 to April 2011 are used ( (Eurostat, 2012) .
At the first glance, as shown on Figure 1 , wheat producer price developments in Hungary and Slovenia follow rather similar patterns over time that might suggest the validity of H1. Yet, these wheat producer price level patterns might indicate that Slovenia, as a traditionally net wheat importer, largely follows producer price developments of the net wheat exporter Hungary. This might imply the validity of H2, i.e., Slovenian wheat producer prices are determined by the Hungarian wheat producer prices.
The impact of the EU accession on May 1 st , 2004 is not visible on wheat producer price series. Interesting pre-and post-accession differences may be noted however on the trade share ( Figure 2) . Because of the already liberalized pre-accession regional trade relations between Hungary and Slovenia due to the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the importance of Hungarian wheat exports in total Slovenian imports are equally important in the pre-and postaccession period. During the pre-accession period, the volatility of Hungarian export share in total wheat imported to Slovenia was much higher (the standard deviation in the pre-accession period is 0.36 against 0.15 in the post-accession period).
--insert Table 1 here -insert Figure 1 here --insert Figure 2 here -
Quantitative results
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The empirical analysis of wheat market integration between Hungary and Slovenia is done in four steps. First, we assess the time series properties of data, followed in a second step by the estimation of a linear VEC model, capable to assess the validity of the LOP (H1) and the causality relations between Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices (H2). In a third step, we estimate a non-linear, threshold cointegration model, testing whether adjustments to departures from long-run equilibrium are equal in case of negative and positive price deviations (H3). Finally, we assess the impact of wheat trade volumes on wheat producer price market integration, estimating a wheat trade share dependent non-linear model, again suitable for LOP tests (H4).
Time series data properties
The logged Hungarian (PWHU) and Slovenian (PWSVN) wheat producer prices, as well as the share of wheat imports from Hungary in total Slovenian wheat imports (SHARE_HU) are tested for unit roots 5 . Table 2 reports the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results for the time series and their first differences (second part of Table 2 ). At 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected for the price series in levels, regardless of the deterministic specifications (constant or constant and trend). The first differences are however stationary, thus both time series are integrated of order 1, i.e. contain one unit root. On the other hand, the SHARE_HU variable proved to be stationary, rejecting the unit root null for both the time series in levels and its first difference at even 1% level of significance.
-Insert There are a large number of unit root tests in the empirical literature. Unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks, to control for possible EU accession or Euro adoption (Slovenia) effects were also applied. Results, however, confirmed ADF outcomes, with break dummies for above periods not being statistically significant.
Since the time series for the Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices, respectively, were found to be non-stationary, the cointegration framework is generally suitable for further analysis.
First, we proceed with linear cointegration, followed by the estimation of a linear VEC model. Both the Johansen et al. (2000) trace, and the Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000) tests reject the no cointegration (0 cointegration vectors) hypothesis at 6% (or 1%) level of significance, however the null hypothesis of a single cointegration vector cannot be rejected (p=0.6 and 0.8 respectively) concluding that the Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer price series are cointegrated with one cointegrating vector (Table 3 ).
-insert Table 3 here -
Using the cointegration test results, a linear VEC model (equation 3) is estimated in the next
step. Information criteria selected one lagged autoregressive short-run term. Table 4 presents the results.
-insert Table 4 here -LM tests 6 up to the 4 th lags, and Portmanteau autocorrelation tests up to the 12 th lags emphasize that VEC model is well specified, residuals do not suffer from serial autocorrelation at 5% level of significance. The Jarque-Bera statistics, however, reject the residual normal distribution hypothesis at conventional levels. Residual non-normality implies that the test results must be interpreted with care, although asymptotic results do hold for a wider class of distributions (von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998).
Thus, the long-run relationship between Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices in equation (12) (3) and (4) suggesting as expected, the weak exogeneity of Hungarian prices. Formal likelihood ratio testing the null hypothesis of weakly exogenous Hungarian prices, and thus, long-run Granger causality (Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987) running from Hungarian towards Slovenian prices, result χ 2 (1)=0.786 with a significance level of p=0.73. This result implies that as a priori expected, Hungarian wheat producer prices determine Slovenian wheat producer prices, not rejecting H2 null.
Adjustments of price deviations from long-run equilibrium
The linear model, however, is not capable to offer information with respect to the symmetry or asymmetry of price adjustments. To assess whether Slovenian wheat producer price adjustment to long-run equilibrium is responding in a similar fashion to Hungarian wheat producer price increases or decreases, next we employ the Enders and Siklos (2001) threshold cointegration test. The threshold value is set to zero 7 , thus the obtained ρ1 and ρ2 coefficients (above and be-low threshold, see equation (5)) reflect adjustments of the positive and negative price deviations from long-run equilibrium. The test results are presented in Table 5 .
-insert Table 5 here -
The empirical results in Table 5 interests for competitive spatial international wheat producer price integration and rather smooth price transmission. Thus the asymmetric VEC model estimated according to equation (7) is reduced to the equation (4), and the VEC model results in Table 4 .
The importance of bilateral wheat trade
We proceed to test the importance of trade flows between Hungary and Slovenia. More exactly, whether the wheat imported from Hungary in total wheat imported by Slovenia plays any role in horizontal spatial wheat producer price market integration and LOP. The choice of the stationary (Table 2) threshold variable, SHARE_HU, reflects the importance of spatial market price integration of Slovenia to the Hungarian wheat producer market (see Figure 2 and (11)) and the threshold values are presented on Figure 3 .
-insert Figure 3 here -
The maximum LMγ statistic is 12.088, significant at 1%, and corresponds to a threshold value of 0.5719. Thus two regimes with distinct long-run parameters are identified. The first regime contains 26 observations, and is active when the share of Slovenian imports from Hungary in total Slovenian imports is less than 57%. The second, larger regime pools 110 observations, when the wheat import share from Hungary in total Slovenian wheat imports is more than 57%.
The estimated regime dependent VEC model is presented in Table 6 .
-insert Table 6 here -
The non-linear VEC model in Table 6 is composed of 2 regimes, displaying coefficients with correct signs. The smaller (first) regime is less well specified with some evidence of residual serial autocorrelation at smaller lags. For the regime with most observations (second), there is no trace of residual serial autocorrelation up to the 4 th lag 9 , and most of the autoregressive terms are significant. The residual normality assumption is only rejected for one of the four equations, namely for the Hungarian wheat producer price equation in the second regime 10 . The long-run relationship between Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices, conditioned on the magnitude of SHARE_HU variable (for constant and slope coefficients significance, see Table 6 ), is:
Thus, depending on the share of Slovenian wheat imports from Hungary (below or above 57.2%), 1% increase in Hungarian wheat producer prices induce a 50% or 65% price increase in Slovenian wheat producer prices. Similarly to the linear model, the highly significant coefficients do not seem to support neither the strong or weak versions of the LOP. The formal likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis βPWHU = 1, result χ 2 (1) = 67.29 and χ 2 (1) = 76.30 for the first and second regime respectively, both significant at 1%, thus again rejecting the H1 null.
The speed of adjustment coefficients are significant (p=0.04 and 0.01 respectively), with the right sign for the Slovenian equations (αΔPWSVN = -0.57 and -0.37), and statistically not different from 0 for the Hungarian equations (likelihood ratio test results for the two regimes are χ 2 (1) = 1.57 and χ 2 (1) = 1.15 respectively, none significant) reinforcing the previous results with respect to causality running from Hungarian towards Slovenian wheat producer prices (H2). As with the linear model, this result implies that, as a priori expected, Hungarian wheat producer prices determine Slovenian wheat producer prices, not rejecting H2 null.
To sum up, Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006) exogenous threshold driven cointegration confirmed previous linear and non-linear results, with respect to the rejection of either strong or weak versions of the LOP. In addition, it detected two trade-share dependent long-run price elasticity relationships, albeit with rather small difference (49% and 65% in the first and second regimes, respectively). Table 7 presents some descriptive statistics of the Hungarian share in total monthly Slovenian wheat imports (SHARE_HU) in the two regimes.
-insert Table 7 here -
The larger regime (price elasticity is 0.65), with 110 observations |(108 after adjustments for autoregressive terms) may be considered the 'normal regime', when on average 82% of Slovenian wheat imports originate from Hungary. Actually, in some months, all Slovenian imports originate in Hungary. In addition, the Slovenian Adriatic coast port Koper is also used for Hungarian wheat exports, and this port is also used for Slovenian wheat imports from the rest of the world. As a possible consequence, wheat producer prices in additional to bilateral wheat trading relations are determined by the world or international wheat prices, which in a case of Hungarian wheat export, this is f.o.b. price, while in a case of Slovenian wheat import, this is c.i.f. price.
As a result, these international wheat price relations determine also bilateral wheat producer prices in Hungary and Slovenia. In contrast, the small regime (price elasticity equals 0.50) is when Hungary plays a smaller role in Slovenian wheat imports, averaging 25.6% of total imports. The maximum in this regime equals the threshold, whilst in a few cases there are no imports at all from Hungary. Another interesting statistic differentiating the two regimes is the standard deviation/mean ratio (relative standard deviation). This statistic equals 0.77 in the first regime, but just 0.15 in the larger regime suggesting not just higher volatility of traded quantities, but also that the small regime collects the extremes and is characterized by sudden changes.
DISCUSSION AND AGRIBUSINESS IMPLICATIONS
To sum up, very robust results were obtained. We employed three different methodologies for an in-depth assessment of the wheat producer price relationship between Hungary and Slovenia, its determinants and more specifically whether the LOP holds between two neighbouring small open NMS of the EU, engaged in wheat trade. All cointegration tests showed a strong long-run relationship between Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices. More importantly, however, all three methods employed rejected the LOP hypothesis (i.e., rejected H1), and thus the unit elasticity. This has important international business implications and is in line with most empirical studies, which have failed to show the validity of the LOP, even in a single country/multi-regions setting (e.g. Brosig et al. 2011 , Eryigit & Karaman, 2010 . Listorti and Esposti (2012) argue that since the concept of LOP is a static one, with quite restrictive assumptions, it is unlikely to be observable in practice for longer periods. Price causality was tested in the linear VEC model and Gonzalo-Pitarakis VEC model alike, both strongly concluding that Hungarian wheat producer prices are determining Slovenian ones (i.e., not rejecting the H2 null). A rather rarely employed Enders and Siklos (2001) cointegration test, which is capable of detecting short-run adjustment asymmetries, could not reject the symmetric short-run price adjustment as response for positive or negative deviations from long-run equilibrium, thus suggesting competitive market conditions (i.e., not rejecting H3 null). We also do not reject H4 null, i.e. that price elasticities are trade volume dependent, albeit the difference between the regime dependent coefficients is rather small.
Therefore, despite the similar evolution of Hungarian and Slovenian wheat producer prices, the existing long-run cointegration, common EU membership and non-the-less being neighbour-20 ing countries with rather favourable transport infrastructure (railway and motorway connections) the LOP does not hold. At first glance, it might seem to be a surprising result, considering that the Slovenian port Koper is also one of the important gateways of the Hungarian wheat export, and the very large share Hungary possess in total Slovenian wheat imports. Manrai and Manrai (2001) , based on the demographic-economic demand potential and the availability of logistics infrastructure as attractiveness for international marketing operations, efficient distribution and promotion of products, they separated Hungary and Slovenia in two different clusters:
Hungary in Cluster 1 (the most promising group of countries attractive on both dimensions) and Slovenia in Cluster 2 (either moderate in terms of attractiveness on both dimensions or countries with a trade-off between two dimensions; one high, other low). This difference can be one of the reasons that the LOP does not hold.
Considering the competitiveness of the European wheat market, however, we may argue that:
-regardless of the extreme importance it plays for Slovenia in this respect, Hungary is just one of many suppliers on the international wheat market, which is dominated by much larger players (e.g. Germany, Russia, Ukraine and some overseas countries).
-Previous research emphasized that Hungarian wheat producer prices are caused by the largest buyer, i.e., Germany (Bakucs et al., 2012) . It is plausible to accept, that despite causality tests persistently emphasizing the information running from Hungary towards the neighbouring Slovenia, wheat producer prices in both countries are actually determined by the regional (e.g.
German and possibly some other regional) and global wheat markets, through a 'hidden' causality relationship, not the subject of this paper.
-Except German, Austrian, Italian and perhaps Dutch destinations, Hungarian wheat exports run through the Slovenian port of Koper, thus it is reliant on wheat international trade running through the Slovenian port.
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-Despite its considerable role in the Slovenian wheat imports, and the relative importance on the European wheat market, Hungarian wheat producer market remains typical for a small open economy, with a price taking behaviour on the regional and other global wheat markets. Thus, despite its very large share in Slovenian wheat imports it cannot exercise market power, or alter prices set on the international market.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamics of spatial wheat producer price transmission be- 
